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Abstract 
Previous research has demonstrated that gender influences negotiation behavior 
and outcomes. Using role congruity theory, this study examined if the context of 
the negotiation, specifically the type of negotiation (integrative vs. distributive), 
minimized gender effects in choice of negotiation medium. The relationship 
between fear of backlash, anxiety, and self-efficacy on preference for negotiation 
medium (virtual vs. face-to-face) was also examined. This study used a 2 Gender: 
(Male, Female) x 2 Negotiation Type: (Distributive, Integrative) between-
participants design with 206 undergraduate students from a voluntary research 
pool. Multiple logistic regression revealed a main effect of gender on negotiation 
medium, but no significant interaction of the negotiation approach on the choice 
of interaction mode and gender. Moderated regression revealed no significant 
main effects for fear of backlash or self-efficacy on the preference for virtual 
negotiations, but there was a significant main effect of anxiety on the preference 
for virtual negotiations. There was also a significant interaction with gender 
moderating the relationship between fear of backlash and preference for virtual 
negotiation, but not for the other variables of anxiety or self-efficacy. The 
implications of these findings are discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Introduction 
Negotiations are an important means of resolving conflict and making 
decisions. In the workplace, negotiations are used for finalizing contracts, 
allocating resources, making decisions, and resolving differences of opinions. 
Walton and McKersie (1965) defined negotiation as the “deliberate interactions of 
two or more complex social units which are attempting to define or redefine the 
terms of their interdependence (p. 3).” Negotiations can occur both formally and 
informally under different contexts, such as the structure of the negotiation or the 
medium the negotiation occurs through. It appears that the negotiation processes 
and outcomes can differ based on individual differences, and specifically by 
gender(e.g., Amantullah & Morris, 2010; Bear & Babcock, 2012; Bowles, 
Babcock, & McGinn, 2005; Elfenbien, 2015; Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & 
Linnabery, 2013). It is worthwhile to better understand these gender differences 
for their own sake, as well as their impact in workplace discrimination and the 
gender pay gap.  
The gender pay gap refers to the difference in average earning between 
men and women employees. The gender pay gap is a continuing international 
problem which seems unlikely to vanish at its current rate of convergence (Blau 
& Kahn, 2007; Khoreva, 2011). The gender pay gap has been explained as falling 
into two categories: macro and micro (Auster, 1989). The macro level proposes 
that women are seen as a homogeneous group, while the micro level focuses on 
the contextual factors that lead to biases (Auster, 1989; Khoreva, 2011). The 
slowdown of the gender pay gap convergence (Blau & Kahn, 2006; Blau & Kahn, 
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2007) has been explained by numerous factors including changes in gender 
differences in unmeasured characteristics and in labor market discrimination 
(Blau & Kahn, 2006). Individual factors such as pay expectations, gender role 
orientation, and perceived pay fairness continue to facilitate the perception of the 
gender pay gap (Khoreva, 2011). These micro level contextual factors are 
therefore important to research to accelerate the gender pay gap convergence. 
Investigating the negotiation context, which has the potential to create a situation 
which can either eliminate or encourage inequalities between individuals, is a 
desirable contribution to the understanding of why the gender pay gap still occurs. 
If a situation exists which minimizes gender effects in negotiations, this would 
guide an understanding of remedies and interventions organizations could 
implement to create equal opportunities for employees. This paper aims to 
evaluate the creation of such a situation through the context of the negotiation, 
using the understanding of role congruity theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002) as its 
foundation.  
This research aimed to examine the relationship between negotiation 
context and individual differences. Specifically, I first review the different types 
of negotiations. Then, the impact of individual differences, specifically gender, on 
negotiations are discussed. Finally, the relationship between negotiation context 
and gender are discussed. These findings are then be discussed in the context of 
the gender pay gap convergence.  
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Approaches to Negotiations 
Two common approaches to workplace negotiations are labeled 
distributive (also known as win – lose) and integrative (or win – win) 
negotiations. In a distributive negotiation, the interests of the negotiators are 
negatively correlated, such that a positive outcome for one party is associated 
with a decrease for the other party involved (Walter & McKersie, 1965). 
Behaviors from a distributive frame point can be classified as claiming value from 
a fixed pie perspective (Brett, 2007). Examples of claiming value behaviors 
include making single issue offers, referring to the “bottom line”, referring to a 
negotiator’s power, and using threats (Weingart, Olekalns, & Smith, 2006). 
Integrative negotiations hold the possibility of joint gain from the negotiation, 
where both parties can find a positive solution. Integrative framing contains 
behaviors that create value by expanding the pie of resources (Brett, 2007). 
Behaviors that exemplify creating value include making multi-issue offers, 
making positive comments, and suggesting compromise (Weingart et al., 2006). It 
is common for individuals to enter a negotiation with cognitive biases, such as 
incompatibility error and fixed sum error, in which both parties believe that their 
interests, and importance of interests are incompatible (Thompson & Hastie, 
1990; Thompson, Neal, & Sinaceur, 2004). 
Negotiations can occur in many different ways and no longer constrained 
to face-to-face interactions, with the opportunity to use technology available daily 
(Nadler & Shestowsky, 2006). Negotiations take place virtually (through email, 
text, telephone, or video), as well as face-to-face. The communication medium 
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affects the negotiation process and outcomes through the properties of 
synchronicity, communication channels, and efficacy (McGinn & Croson, 2004). 
Social awareness in negotiation is enhanced by high efficacy, synchronous 
communication with multiple communication channels, such as through face-to-
face and videoconferencing mediums, which leads to a shared understanding of 
the negotiation process (McGinn & Croson, 2004). Media-rich communication 
are those that have display cues, tones, facial expressions, and body language, 
such as face-to-face and videoconferencing. Media-poor communication (e.g. 
telephone and email) obstructs the transfer of cues and expressions. Media-rich 
communication, as opposed to media-poor communication, are believed to 
encourage collaborative behaviors during negotiations than poorer media, such as 
over the telephone or computer-mediated written communications (Purdy & Nye, 
2000). Purdy and Nye (2000) suggest that high media richness reduces the 
required bargaining time and increases outcome satisfaction and the desire for 
future negotiation interactions. When media-poor communication is used in 
negotiations, individuals can experience the other party to be more distant an 
unknown, compared to face-to-face negotiations (Nadler & Shestowsky, 2006).  
When the negotiating parties have no prior relationship, contact, or shared 
identity, the communication medium used for negotiating can exert a strong 
influence on the perception of one’s negotiating counterpart and the subsequent 
outcome of the negotiation. This is prevalent in virtual communication, given the 
reduction and/or absence of visual information and non-verbal cues (Nadler & 
Shestowsky, 2006). It is also possible that in some situations virtual 
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communication neutralizes cues of status and composure, creating a degree of 
equality in negotiations (Wachter, 1999). This research hopes to examine this 
potential effect. 
Individual Differences in Negotiations 
Gender. Overall, women have been found to negotiate slightly worse 
economic outcomes than men (Mazei et al., 2015; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). 
Because negotiations provide resources, these negotiations may impact gender 
equality in the workplace. Role congruity theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002) has been 
used to explain why these gender differences occur in a negotiation (for a review 
see Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). Agentic qualities like assertiveness, 
confidence, and dominance are typically expected of an individual in a 
negotiating role, but are incongruent with the traditional female gender role. 
Because of this role incongruity, prejudice against women in negotiator roles 
leads to women being perceived as less favorable in the role, or even achieving 
less economic success than men. As stated by Stuhlmacher and Linnabery (2013), 
this role incongruity does not mean that women are incapable of being good 
negotiators, or that communal attributes are not important in negotiations. This 
role incongruity instead implies that there are particular challenges in negotiations 
for women to overcome. 
Female negotiators risk an unfavorable evaluation for being inconsistent 
with what is anticipated. This backlash is reduced when women negotiate on 
behalf of someone else, as opposed to negotiating for themselves, because it is 
more consistent with the traditional female gender role (Amanatullah & Morris, 
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2010; Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007). When negotiating for oneself, the 
negotiation outcomes favored men, but the difference was no longer present when 
negotiators were acting on the behalf of, or advocating for, a single individual. 
Indeed, meta-analytic research finds that women are more successful than men 
when negotiating on behalf of another (Mazei et al., 2015). 
The framing of a negotiation also affects gendered outcomes. Women 
were more likely to initiate a negotiation when they were cued to “ask” instead of 
to “negotiate” (Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2007). Small and 
colleagues (2007) argue that this is because the language of asking is more 
consistent with a lower social role, and a gesture of politeness. Additionally, when 
the task was framed as more congruent with their social role based on the topic of 
the negotiation, women were more successful negotiators (Bear, 2011; Bear & 
Babcock, 2012). In a lab-based experiment, Bear (2011) found an interaction 
between gender and negotiation topic. Participants were assigned to read a 
scenario, the topic being either masculine (compensation) or feminine (workplace 
lactation room), in which someone expressed a desire to negotiate. The 
participants could choose to either negotiate with the individual themselves or 
avoid it by passing it off to someone else. Men were significantly more likely to 
avoid a negotiation when the topic concerned a lactation room than when it 
concerned compensation. Additionally, women were significantly more likely to 
avoid compensation negotiation compared to the lactation room condition. 
Similarly, men outperformed women in a negotiation task when the topic was 
masculine of nature (e.g., motorcycle headlights), but the gender difference was 
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eliminated when the topic was feminine (e.g., jewelry beads) (Bear & Babcock, 
2012). When the topic was compensation, men were found to indicate a higher 
likelihood of active negotiation than women (Kaman & Hartel, 1994).  
In a negotiation, individuals are expected to be aggressive, egotistic, and 
focused the outcomes; this fits into the agentic masculine gender role. It has been 
suggested that in a negotiation, women will apply more cooperative strategies, 
while men will apply more competitive strategies (Miles & LaSalle, 2009; Rubin 
& Brown, 1975). A meta-analysis (Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998) found 
that women were slightly more cooperative than men in negotiations, but the 
effect reversed in certain situations. One of these situations was during non-face-
to-face negotiations. In these situations, women displayed more competitive 
behaviors than men. This occurred when the interaction only transpired through a 
declaration of one’s choices and communication was limited, reducing the need to 
fit perceptions of cooperativeness. This hidden identity in virtual negotiations is 
one of the example factors outlined by Stuhlmacher and Linnabery (2013) that 
could potentially increase negotiator role and gender role congruity for women. 
Gender and approach to negotiations. The question remains as to how 
gender impacts integrative negotiations. In an integrative distribution, higher joint 
outcomes are achieved through communications and prosocial motives which fit 
into the communal roles. Thompson and DeHarpport (1998) found that when 
friends perceived a negotiation task as a problem-solving situation and were 
similar in communal orientation, they were more likely to make the most of joint 
interests. Participants were assigned to either a problem-solving condition or a 
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bargaining condition. Participants who viewed the task as a joint problem-solving 
situation, as opposed to those who viewed the task as a bargaining situation, 
expected the interaction to be more cooperative, less competitive, and more fair.  
Gender and virtual negotiations. In a virtual environment, social roles 
are less prescribed, providing a weak situation with high ambiguity for behavioral 
expectations (Stuhlmacher, Citera, & Willis, 2007). In a written virtual 
negotiation, there are fewer cues (voice hesitation, tone, eye contact, body 
language, facial expression, etc.), which allows for female roles to be less salient 
and the negotiator role to be more salient, which permits women to be more 
aggressive than in face-to-face negotiations (Stuhlmacher et al., 2007; 
Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). Virtual negotiations also equalize pre-
negotiation power differences (Turnbull, Strickland, & Shaver, 1976).  
Stuhlmacher and Reich (2017) found a gender difference in the behavioral 
outcome of choosing a negotiation medium, of face-to-face or a chat program on a 
computer. Participants were told that they were going to negotiate a job offer with 
an individual in a different room. Participants were given instructions in preparing 
for a traditional distributive salary negotiation. After reading over the task, they 
were asked if they would like the negotiation to be face-to-face or over a chat 
program on a computer. Women were 5.28 times more likely than men to choose 
the chat program than face-to-face for their negotiation. This finding found a 
gender difference in the behavior of individuals as they approach a negotiation. 
This paper build offs of the findings of Stuhlmacher and Reich to test how 
the negotiation situation will change the individuals’ choice of negotiation 
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medium. It was expected that women are more likely than men to choose to 
negotiate virtually in a distributive negotiation than an integrative negotiation. 
Virtual negotiations make the female gender role less salient (Stuhlmacher & 
Linnabery, 2013), and could be seen as an advantage to women as they enter a 
traditional distributive negotiation. However, integrative negotiations are aligned 
more with the female gender role. Therefore, framing a negotiation as integrative 
would be congruent for women, and provide a situation where women are more 
likely to choose face-to-face instead of virtual negotiation. 
Explanatory Variables 
 Fear of Backlash. One factor that impacts gender differences in 
negotiation outcomes is fear of backlash. The effects of backlash are defined as 
“social and economic reprisals for behaving counter stereotypically” (Rudman, 
1998). For women, backlash can occur when they present themselves with agency 
and authority, violating their communal gender role. This puts women in a 
dilemma where they must choose to avoid backlash by staying in line with their 
gender roles and be liked but not respected, or display agentic qualities that match 
job-specific demands and be respected but potentially not liked (Rudman & 
Phelan, 2008). In a lab-based experiment testing the status incongruity hypothesis, 
women who were high on agency in leadership positions suffered the most 
sabotage compared to all other targets (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 
2012). Initiating a negotiation also has a greater social cost for women (as 
compared to men), where there is less interest for working with a woman whom 
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initiated a negotiation than for a woman whom did not initiate a negotiation 
(Bowles et al., 2007).  
Therefore, in a traditional distributive negotiation, women may expect 
more backlash for violating their gender stereotype and negotiating solely for 
themselves. In a negotiation that is framed as integrative, women may expect less 
backlash because they are attempting to reach a deal which is mutually beneficial 
and shows concern for others, which is in line with their gender role. The fear of 
backlash may therefore change the behavior of a woman choosing her negotiation 
medium. If backlash is expected because of the distributive negotiation, women 
may be more likely to choose to negotiate virtually where their social role is less 
prescribed. If backlash is not expected because of an integrative negotiation, 
gender will moderate the impact of fear of backlash and women may be more 
likely to choose face-to-face negotiation because the female gender role can be 
beneficial in this situation. 
Anxiety. A second individual difference that influences negotiations are 
feelings of anxiety. Anxiety is a state of psychological arousal, which one 
experiences in response to a situation where the individual is uncertain about a 
novel situation, the potential for undesirable outcomes, and the inability to alter 
the course of events (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011; Gray, 1991; Raghunathan & 
Pham, 1999). Anxious individuals have been found to be biased in favor of low-
risk/low-reward options when it comes to decision making (Raghunathan & 
Pham, 1999). For example, when compared to a neutral emotional state, anxious 
negotiators had lower expectations, made lower first offers, responded to 
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counteroffers more quickly, and exited negotiations earlier (Brooks & Schweitzer, 
2011). Additionaly, consistent with the belief that women are more anxious in 
traditional negotiations, women (compared to men) are found to experience 
greater relief when their first offer is accepted, specifically in weak situations 
(Kray & Gelfand, 2009). 
Anxious individuals may be more likely to choose to negotiate virtually to 
reduce some of the pressure from face-to-face negotiations. In a distributive 
negotiation, individuals may experience more anxiety, as it is consistent with the 
traditional bargaining view. Therefore, when individuals, specifically women, are 
presented with a distributive negotiation situation, it could result in higher anxiety 
because it is gender incongruent. In an integrative negotiation, individuals are 
instructed to work together to receive an ideal solution for both parties involved. 
This minimizes the potential for undesirable outcomes, and may therefore lead to 
lower anxiety. With this lower anxiety, individuals may be more likely to 
negotiate face-to-face, as the risk and pressure of the negotiation is now lower 
because of the situation. 
Negotiator Self-efficacy.  A third individual difference variable that 
influences negotiation is self-efficacy. Self-efficacy is the belief that one can 
succeed and reach his or her goal. Individuals with high negotiation self-efficacy 
were less affected by anxiety, moderating the effects on earlier exits from a 
negotiation, which results in lower economic outcomes (Brooks & Schweitzer, 
2011). While a direct effect for self-efficacy on outcomes was not found, 
Sullivan, O’Connor, and Burris (2006) found a direct effect on negotiators’ 
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behaviors, and an indirect effect on negotiation outcomes. Individuals with high 
distributive negotiator self-efficacy were more likely to use choose distributive 
tactics, such as claiming value by dividing fixed resources, aiming to make the 
other party make concessions, and collecting most of the resources, which lead to 
positive outcomes on distributive issues. Individuals with high integrative 
negotiator self-efficacy choose more integrative tactics, such as creating value by 
exchanging information about interests, packaging interests in a creative way, and 
rapport building, which lead to positive outcomes for integrative issues. 
Furthermore, negotiator self-efficacy had a strong influence on a negotiators’ 
choice of tactics during the initial phase of a negotiation, which is a time when the 
negotiator is most anxious.  
Self-efficacy is also impacted by the contextual ambiguity of the situation, 
when cues are either strong or weak and protocols are either known or unknown. 
Miles and LaSalle (2008) found that counterpart self-efficacy was strongly related 
to performance in negotiation situation with higher contextual ambiguity than in 
situations of lower contextual ambiguity. Therefore, when the context of the 
situation was weak and unclear, the perceived self-efficacy of the negotiating 
counterpart was more important in the negotiation. When the structure and/or 
context of a negotiation is unclear, individual differences begin to play a role in 
the performance of the negotiator and the overall outcome of the negotiation.  
Rationale 
 Previous research has shown that gender influences negotiation behavior 
and outcomes (e.g., Amantullah & Morris, 2010; Bear & Babcock, 2012; Bowles, 
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Babcock, & McGinn, 2005; Elfenbien, 2015; Mazei et al., 2015). Distributive 
negotiations tend to focus on claiming resources, while integrative negotiations 
focus on creating resources to achieve higher joint outcomes (Beersma & De 
Dreu, 2002; De Dreu et al., 2000; Giebels et al., 2000). If virtual negotiations 
reduce gender role pressures and expectations (Stuhlmacher et al., 2007; 
Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013), it was expected that in a distributive 
negotiation, men will be more likely to choose face-to-face negotiation, while 
women would be more likely to choose virtual negotiations.  
 Previous research found that women who display agentic qualities as part 
of their job requirements experience backlash for doing so (Rudman & Phelan, 
2008; Rudman et al., 2012). Distributive negotiations seem to require negotiators 
to be more aggressive and agentic, which causes women to fear potential backlash 
when entering a distributive negotiation. Therefore, it was expected that those 
who fear backlash would be more likely to choose virtual negotiations than face-
to-face negotiation where their gender roles are more prescribed.  
 Anxiety has been found to influence the outcomes of negotiations and 
decision making (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). 
Women have been found to be more anxious negotiators (Kray & Gelfand, 2009). 
Therefore, it was proposed that women with high anxiety would be more likely to 
choose virtual negotiations, which have been found to equalize pre-negotiation 
power differences (Turnbull, Strickland, & Shaver, 1976). 
 High negotiator self-efficacy has been found to moderate the effects of 
anxiety and have an effect on the outcome of a negotiation (Brooks & Schweitzer, 
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2011; Sullivan et al., 2006). Specifically, high distributive self-efficacy has led to 
positive outcomes on distributive issues and high integrative self-efficacy has led 
to positive outcomes on integrative issues (Sullivan et al., 2006). Given that 
distributive negotiations are more in line with agentic qualities, and integrative 
negotiations are more in line with communal qualities, it was proposed that self-
efficacy would mediate an individual’s choice of interaction mode. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I. There will be a main effect of gender on choice of negotiation 
interaction mode. Men will be more likely to pick face-to-face negotiations than 
women. 
Hypothesis II. There will be an interaction of the negotiation approach on choice 
of interaction mode and gender with fewer women choosing face-to-face over 
virtual negotiation in distributively framed tasks than in integratively framed 
tasks. 
Hypothesis III. More fear of backlash will be associated with stronger preference 
for virtual negotiations than face-to-face. 
Hypothesis IV. More anxiety will be associated with more preference for virtual 
negotiations.  
Hypothesis V. Negotiators with lower self-efficacy will be more likely to prefer 
virtual negotiations.  
Hypothesis VI. Gender will moderate the relationship between fear of backlash 
and stronger preferences for virtual negotiations than face-to-face. The 
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relationship between fear of backlash and preferences for virtual negotiations is 
stronger for women than for men. 
Hypothesis VII. Gender will moderate the relationship between anxiety and more 
preference for virtual negotiations. The relationship between anxiety and 
preference for virtual negotiations is stronger for women than for men. 
Hypothesis VIII. Gender will moderate the relationship between self-efficacy 
and more preference for virtual negotiations. The relationship between self-
efficacy and preference for virtual negotiations is stronger for women than for 
men. 
 Method 
Participants 
  Participants were 206 undergraduate students from a voluntary research 
pool. This sample size was based on a medium effect size at power = .80 for a 
two-way ANOVA at =.05 (Cohen, 1992). Participants were at least 18 years of 
age, with 102 female and 104 male participants.  
Design 
This study used a 2 Gender: (Male, Female) x 2 Negotiation Type: 
(Distributive, Integrative) between-participants design.  In the Distributive 
Condition, there were 51 male and 52 female participants. In the Integrative 
Condition, there were 53 male and 50 female participants. 
Procedure 
Upon arrival to the experimental room, participants were greeted by the 
experimenter and were instructed that they were going to work with an individual 
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who is in a different room. All experimenters for this study were female. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a negotiation task (Integrative or 
Distributive) when they arrived according to a random number table (Appendix 
A). After completing informed consent procedures (Appendix B), participants 
read an instruction sheet for the experiment and were told by the experimenter 
that they were going to be participating in job offer negotiation. This study used 
the negotiation task from Stuhlmacher and Reich (2017). Past participants from 
Stuhlmacher and Reich were blocked from participating. 
Half the participants received distributively framed instructions, while 
other participants received integratively framed instructions (see Appendix C). 
These instructions were taken as a variation from the problem-solving condition 
(integrative) and the bargaining condition (distributive) from Thompson and 
DeHarpport (1998).  
Both task conditions began with the same prompt: “You have been hired 
for a new job, but you still need to work out the fine details of terms of 
employment with your hiring manager.” For the distributive condition, the second 
half of the instructions were the following: “Think of this task as a negotiation 
situation in which you are trying to get what you want and must bargain for 
it.” For the integrative condition, the following instructions were used for the 
second half: “Think of this task as a situation in which you face a common 
problem and must work with the hiring manager to create a solution that 
works for both you and the company.” The experimenter explained the 
preference payoff table to the participant and asked if they had any clarification 
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questions. To reinforce the manipulation, participants were asked to list three 
tactics they would use to meet this goal. The researcher also verbally repeated the 
goal of the negotiation to the participant to make sure they understand. 
Next, participants filled out their goals for the negotiation (Appendix D), 
negotiator self-efficacy (Appendix E), and negotiator anxiety (Appendix F). 
Participants then were asked to choose between face-to-face or a text-based chat 
program for the experiment, and rated their preference for both negotiation 
mediums (Appendix G). Participants were then told that there are more topics to 
negotiate if there is enough time. Related to this potential second negotiation, 
participants were then given the second set of tasks (Appendix C), asked to list 
their tactics, goals (Appendix D), and preference for both negotiation mediums 
(Appendix G) again. This was aimed at providing a measure of reliability. 
While the experimenter was seeming to set up for the negotiation by 
stepping out of the room to inform the hiring manager of the chosen negotiation 
medium, the participant filled out the control measures and demographic survey 
(Appendix H). Once the participant finished the measures, they were informed 
that no negotiation or interaction will occur. They then took a measure of 
relief/regret (Appendix I). 
Participants were debriefed (Appendix J) and reasons for the deception 
were explained. Participants received 1.5 credit for research participation for a 
psychology course. The procedure took around 30-45 minutes for each participant 
to complete. Figure 1 provides a flow diagram of the experimental procedure. 
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Measures 
Goals. Participants stated their ideal number of points they wished to 
achieve (range 150 to 750) in the negotiation, the least number of points they 
were willing to accept in the negotiations (range 150 to 750), and a first offer for 
each category (see Appendix D). 
Fear of Backlash. Fear of backlash was measured with two open-ended 
questions (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010), asking how much negotiators can 
reasonably ask for (see Appendix D). Items included: “How much (in total points 
value) do you think you can reasonably ask for without your counterpart 
perceiving you to be a pushy person?” and “How much (in total points value) do 
you think you can reasonably ask for without causing your counterpart to punish 
you for being too demanding?” The two items were averaged into a single 
measure for fear of backlash. To make this number more intuitive during 
analyses, the pole was reversed by subtracting each individual score from 900, 
which was the sum of the possible minimum and maximum answers for the fear 
of backlash items. Higher numbers therefore reflect more fear of backlash. 
Negotiator Self-efficacy. The eight-item negotiator self-efficacy scale 
(Sullivan, O'Connor, & Burris, 2006) was used (see Appendix E). This measure 
has four items on integrative self-efficacy and four items on distributive self-
efficacy. Each item is rated on a 100-point scale, where 0 = no confidence and 
100 = full confidence, describing how confident the participant feels they are in 
using each tactic successfully in a given negotiation. Example items included: 
“Prevent the other negotiator from exploiting your weaknesses (distributive)” 
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“Find tradeoffs that benefit both parties (integrative)”. Self-efficacy was averaged 
into scores for integrative self-efficacy, distributive self-efficacy, and total self-
efficacy. 
Negotiator Anxiety. Negotiator anxiety was measured by four anxiety-
related emotions and four neutral-related emotions (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011). 
Participants rated (1= not strongly at all, 7 = very strongly) four anxiety emotions: 
anxious, apprehensive, worried, and nervous and four neutral emotions: neutral, 
indifferent, unemotional, and calm (see Appendix F). Anxiety was averaged into 
scores for anxious and neutral emotions. 
Negotiation Medium. Preference for medium was measured in two ways: 
behavioral and self-report. Participants were asked to choose to negotiate either 
face-to-face or over a text-based chat program on a computer. Negotiation 
medium was coded as 0 for Face-to-Face, 1 for Virtual. A second measure of self-
report on how strongly they prefer a text-based chat program or face-to-face as 
their medium of negotiation on a single item 7-point spectrum (1 = Face-to-Face, 
7 = Virtual). This item was asked twice for reliability and the average of the two 
scores was used to increase variance. Participants were asked an open-ended 
question on why they chose either face-to-face or chat (see Appendix G). 
Demographics. Formal negotiation experience was measured to control 
for negotiation experience on a 7-point scale (1 = no experience, 7 = I’m an 
expert) (Eflenbein, Curhan, Eisenkraft, Shirako, & Baccaro, 2008). Participants 
responded to one question on sex and race/ethnicity. Technology use was 
measured on a 7-point scale for text-messaging, emails, phone calls, video calls, 
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with 1 = rarely ever communicate this way and 7 = always communicate this way 
(see Appendix H). Gender was coded as 0 for Male, 1 for Female. Race/ethnicity 
was coded as 0 for White, 1 for Black/African American, 2 for American 
Indian/Alaskan Native, 3 for Asian/Pacific Islander, 4 for 
Latino/Hispanic/Spanish Origin, 5 for Biracial, and 6 for Other. 
Negotiator Relief/Regret. Relief and regret (Kray & Gelfand, 2009) was 
measured upon finding out that there was not a real negotiation (Appendix I). The 
two items were on a 7-point scale (1 = no relief/regret, 7 = very 
relieved/regretful). 
Results 
Descriptive Analyses 
Descriptive analyses were run for demographic variables (see Table 1). 
Table 2 provides a breakdown of the means and standard deviations of the 
variables of the main variables based on gender and condition. Pearson correlation 
coefficients between the variables of gender, method chosen, preference for 
negotiation medium, backlash, anxiety, and self-efficacy are provided in Table 3. 
Significant correlations were found between all of the variables. Aimed at 
providing a measure of reliability, preference for virtual negotiation was asked at 
two different time points. These two items were found to have a significant 
correlation (r(204) = 0.83, p < 0.01), and to be internally consistent (a = 0.91), 
allowing us to confidently conclude an individual’s preference for virtual 
negotiations. Additionally, method of negotiation was also found to have a 
significant correlation with both relief (r(204) = 0.40, p < 0.01) and regret  (r(204) 
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= -0.23, p < 0.01). Participants who chose virtual negotiation, compared to 
participants who chose face-to-face negotiations, were more relieved and less 
regretful upon finding out that there would not be a real negotiation. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypotheses I & II. Multiple logistic regression was run in R to analyze 
hypotheses 1-2. Model 0 was the main effects model which examined the effect of 
the variables gender, fear of backlash, anxiety, and negotiator self-efficacy on the 
dichotomous dependent variable for choice of negotiation medium (Table 4). 
Model 1 was the interaction effects model, which examined the interaction of 
gender on the variables of fear of backlash, anxiety, and negotiator self-efficacy 
on the dichotomous dependent variable for choice of negotiation medium (Table 
5). An ANOVA was computed to compare Model 1 to Model 0 (Table 6) finding 
that Model 1 explained more variance above and beyond that of Model 0 
(F(4,196) = 6.011, p = 0.198. Therefore, the coefficients from Model 1 were used 
to analyze Hypotheses I-II. 
Analyses revealed a main effect of gender on choice of interaction mode 
(b = 0.67, z(204) = 1.49, p = 0.137), with men, compared to women, being more 
likely to pick face-to-face negotiations over virtual negotiations, supporting 
Hypothesis I. However, there was not a strong effect for the interaction of the 
negotiation approach on the choice of negotiation medium and gender (b = -0.14, 
z(204) = -0.22, p = 0.829), leaving Hypothesis II unsupported.   
As shown in Table 8 (see Table 7 for the probability estimates for the 
Main Effects Model 0), in the distributively framed negotiations, the probability 
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to choose to negotiate face-to-face was higher for males (65.12%), than compared 
to females (48.88%). In the integratively framed negotiations, the probability to 
choose to negotiate face-to-face was still higher for males (75.77%), than 
compared to females (61.57%). Given the effect for both the main effect of 
anxiety (b = 0.85, z(204) = 2.67, p = 0.008), as well as the interaction of gender 
and anxiety (b = -0.78, z(204) = -1.97, p = 0.048), Table 9 breaks down the 
probability estimates based on high/low anxiety. The probability of choosing to 
negotiate face-to-face was highest for males when they had low anxiety in both 
the distributely (73.92%) and integratively (82.61%) framed negotiations, as 
compared to high anxiety in the distibutively (55.14%) and integratively (67.32%) 
framed negotiations. The probability of choosing to negotiate face-to-face was 
also highest for females when they had low anxiety in both the distributely 
(59.22%) and integratively (70.88%) framed negotiations, as compared to high 
anxiety in the distibutively (38.64%) and integratively (51.34%) framed 
negotiations.  
Hypotheses III-VIII. Moderated regression was run in R to analyze 
hypotheses 3-8, with the continuous variables of fear of backlash, anxiety, and 
negotiator self-efficacy centered. Model 0 was the main effects model which 
examined the effect of the variables gender, fear of backlash, anxiety, and 
negotiator self-efficacy on the dependent variable of preference for virtual 
negotiations (Table 10). Model 1 was the interaction effects model, which 
examined the interaction of gender on the variables of fear of backlash, anxiety, 
and negotiator self-efficacy on the dependent variable of preference for virtual 
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negotiations (Table 11). An ANOVA was computed to compare Model 1 to 
Model 0 (Table 12) finding that Model 1 significantly explained more variance 
above and beyond that of Model 0 (F(4,196) = 2.25, p = 0.065). Therefore, the 
coefficients from Model 1 were used to analyze Hypotheses III-VIII.  
Hypothesis III predicted that more fear of backlash leads to a stronger 
preference for virtual negotiations than face-to-face, was unsupported (b = 0.03, 
t(204) = 0.34, p = 0.732). Hypothesis IV predicted that more anxiety leads to 
increased preference for virtual negotiation was found to be supported (b = 0.23, 
t(204) = 1.98, p = 0.049). Hypothesis V predicted that negotiators with lower self-
efficacy will prefer virtual negotiations, was unsupported (b = -0.16, t(204) = -
1.34, p = 0.183). Figure 2 depicts the overall model for Hypotheses III-VIII based 
on Model 1. As predicted, greater fear of backlash and greater anxiety had a 
positive relationship with preference for virtual negotiations while greater 
negotiator self-efficacy had a negative relationship with virtual negotiations. 
Hypotheses VII-VIII include gender as a moderator for the variables fear 
of backlash, anxiety, and self-efficacy on the preference for virtual negotiations. 
Gender itself had a significant main effect on the preference for virtual 
negotiations (b = 0.52, t(204) = 2.76, p = 0.006). Hypothesis VI predicted that 
gender would moderate the relationship between fear of backlash and stronger 
preferences for virtual negotiations than face-to-face. Specifically, it was 
predicted that the relationship between fear of backlash and preferences for virtual 
negotiations is stronger for women than for men. This relationship (see Figure 3) 
was supported such that women had a greater fear of backlash with a stronger 
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preference for virtual negotiations (b = 0.33, t(204) = 2.46, p = 0.015). Hypothesis 
VII (see Figure 4) predicted that gender would moderate the relationship between 
anxiety and more preference for virtual negotiations was unsupported (b = -0.19, 
t(204) = -1.27, p = 0.204). Hypothesis VIII (see Figure 5) predicted that gender 
would moderate the relationship between self-efficacy and more preference for 
virtual negotiations was also unsupported (b = 0.09, t(204) = 0.64, p = 0.525). 
Discussion 
This study investigated if the framing of a negotiation impacts an 
individual’s choice of negotiation medium. Specifically, I examined if the gender 
difference in behaviors of individuals as they approach a negotiation found by 
Stuhlmacher and Reich (2017) could be mitigated based on the negotiation 
situation. Drawing on role congruity theory (Eagly & Karau, 2002), I theorized 
that framing a negotiation as integrative would be more congruent for women and 
provide a negotiation situation which aligns the negotiator role with the female 
gender role (Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). 
This study found that there is a significant main effect for gender on both 
choice and preference for mode of negotiations. Consistent with the findings of 
Stuhlmacher and Reich (2017), women, compared to men, were more likely to 
choose to negotiate virtually over a text-based chat program rather than face-to-
face. The framing of the negotiation as distributive or integrative did not impact 
this behavioral decision. 
One prediction that did find support was the moderation of gender 
between fear of backlash and preference for negotiation. The negotiator role in 
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typically viewed as being incongruent with the female gender role (Stuhlmacher 
& Linnabery, 2013). Therefore, when entering a negotiation, women potentially 
put themselves at risk by violating their communal gender role to match the 
agentic qualities of the negotiator role (Rudman & Phelan, 2008). Therefore, this 
finding suggests that women who feel they can only reasonably ask for less 
without being perceived as pushy or too demanding have higher preferences for 
virtual, rather than face-to-face, negotiations.  
Surprisingly, the prediction that gender would moderate the relationships 
between anxiety with preference for virtual negotiations was unsupported. Given 
that past research has shown anxious individuals to be biased in favor of low-
risk/low-reward options (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999), it was expected that the 
relationship between anxiety and preference for virtual negotiations would be 
stronger for women than for men. This prediction was based on the assumption 
that virtual negotiations provided a low-risk outlet that allows female roles to be 
less salient compared to face-to-face negotiations (Stuhlmacher et al., 2007; 
Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). However, anxiety was shown to have a large 
effect on the behavioral decision of choosing face-to-face or a text-based virtual 
chat program for the negotiation. Both men and women with higher anxiety about 
the upcoming negotiation were more likely to choose to negotiate virtually. The 
main effect for anxiety itself on preference for virtual negotiations was 
significant, suggesting that virtual negotiations provides a low-risk outlet for both 
men and women anxious about an upcoming negotiation.  
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Additionally, the prediction that gender would moderate the relationship 
between self-efficacy with preference for virtual negotiations was also 
unsupported. The prediction of self-efficacy was based off of the finding that self-
efficacy has a direct effect on negotiator’s behaviors, such as choosing more 
integrative or distributive tactics (Sullivan et al., 2006). Therefore, while it is 
surprising to find that gender did not moderate the relationship between self-
efficacy and preference for virtual negotiation, future analyses could examine if 
the negotiation condition (distributive vs. integrative) moderates this relationship. 
Limitations  
 One possible limitation is the use of the word “negotiation” throughout. 
Previous research has found that women were more likely to initiate a negotiation 
when they were cued to “ask” instead of to “negotiate” (Small et al., 2007). The 
language of asking is more consistent with a lower social role, while negotiations 
have been typically viewed as an agentic pursuit. The choice to keep the word 
negotiate in the study was to be able to provide direct comparisons between this 
study and the one conducted by Stuhlmacher and Reich (2017). Therefore, future 
research could consider removing the word “negotiate” throughout the study to 
avoid the agentic priming of the negotiation situation. 
 While the framing of the negotiation did not have an effect on the gender 
difference in behaviors of individuals as they approach a negotiation, a second 
limitation of this study was the failure to include the framing condition in the 
analyses for Hypotheses III-VIII. In this present study, Hypotheses III-VIII 
examined if gender moderated the relationship between fear of backlash, anxiety, 
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and negotiator self-efficacy on preference for virtual negotiation. This did not take 
into account if the negotiation was distributively or integratively framed. Given 
the current lack of supported predictions, it would be worthwhile for future 
analyses to include the framing condition while examining Hypotheses VI-VIII. It 
is possible that while it did not have a direct effect on a behavioral outcome 
(Hypothesis II), the framing could have affected the control variables fear of 
backlash, anxiety, and self-efficacy, having an indirect effect on preference for 
virtual negotiation.  
Future Directions 
One area for future research is to consider the time-point participants are 
asked to choose a negotiation medium. In the current procedure participants 
complete the measure for fear of backlash, anxiety, and self-efficacy before being 
told that they have the option to choose between face-to-face or a text-based chat 
program on the computer. It was noted in the experimental lab log that this choice 
was a surprise for some participants, being unaware that there were potential 
options for the negotiation medium. Therefore, the general assumption of 
participants was that they would be participating in a face-to-face negotiation 
when filling out these measures. Method of negotiation was found to have 
significant correlations with all of the variables of interest (Table 2). While not 
included in the proposed hypotheses, a measure of relief and regret was given to 
the participants at the end of the procedure, once they knew that no real 
negotiation would be occurring. Method of negotiation had a significant 
correlation with both relief and regret, such that participants who chose virtual 
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negotiation, compared to participants who chose face-to-face negotiations, were 
more relieved and less regretful upon finding out that there would not be a real 
negotiation. Additionally, fear of backlash after negotiation medium might 
determine if there has been a change in the amount participants feel they can 
reasonable ask for without being perceived as push or demand, especially for 
those who chose to negotiate virtually.  
Implications 
 The findings of this study demonstrated that women, compared to men, 
prefer to negotiate virtually over a text-based chat program rather than face-to-
face, with the fear of backlash being a moderator in this relationship. In the 
workplace context, this is an important consideration for the gender pay gap. This 
study demonstrates that negotiation medium remains a micro level contextual 
factor that can encourage inequalities between individuals for both distributively 
framed and integratively framed negotiations. Given the role of fear of backlash 
in this relationship, it is therefore advised to encourage organizations that 
participate in salary negotiations to consider both virtual and face-to-face options. 
This will allow individuals, particularly women, who feel that they can only 
reasonably ask for less without being perceived as pushy or too demanding, a 
virtual environment with more depersonalization and less social impact than face-
to-face interactions (Stuhlmacher & Citera, 2005; Stuhlmacher et al., 2007). It’s 
important to note, however, that virtual negotiations, compared to face-to-face 
negotiations, have been found to result in lower profit (Stuhlmacher & Citera, 
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2005), therefore this option still does not provide a solution to accelerate the 
gender pay gap convergence.  
When providing this recommendation, it is important to remember the 
Equal Pay Act of 1963 (United States, 1963), in the hopes that these findings will 
not be used to knowingly place individuals, specifically women, at a 
disadvantage. Given that negotiation medium is only one factor that can 
contribute to inequalities in salary negotiations, it is advisable to consider salary 
negotiation practices as a whole, limiting ambiguity and discrimination 
throughout the practice. Therefore, this also calls for further research into 
practices and interventions which create equal opportunities for all employees. 
Overall, the findings of this study demonstrate that both men and women 
with higher anxiety about the upcoming negotiation have a higher preference for 
virtual negotiations. This finding can lead to future research on what specific 
properties of virtual negotiations seem to be more in line with anxious 
negotiators. This could guide interventions and training seminars to equalize 
perceived differences between the two mediums. 
Conclusion 
 This study created a situation which minimized gender effects in 
negotiation by manipulating the framing of the negotiation as distributive or 
integrative. While this manipulation was unsuccessful in reducing the behavioral 
effects found by Stuhlmacher and Reich (2017), it contributes to the negotiation 
literature by demonstrating the strength of this gender difference even with the 
inclusion of an integrative framing, which is theoretically more congruent with 
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the female gender role (Stuhlmacher & Linnabery, 2013). Future research could 
consider the complete removal of the word “negotiate” from the study or the time 
point at which participants are asked to choose a negotiation medium. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics  
Demographic Variable n Percentage Mean SD 
Gender     
Male 104 50.49%   
Female 102 49.51%   
Race/Ethnicity     
White 117 56.80%   
Black/African American 16 7.76%   
Asian/Pacific Islander 21 10.19%   
Latino/Hispanic/Spanish 
Origin 26 12.62%   
Biracial   5 2.43%   
Other 10 4.85%   
Negotiation Experience a     
Face-to-Face     2.99   1.56 
Virtual     2.20   1.48 
Technology Familiarity b     
Text Messages Per Day   77.06 99.34 
Emails Per Day     4.29   8.52 
Phone Calls Per Day     3.78   5.72 
Video Calls Per Day     1.09   1.82 
Note. a Negotiation Experience was measured with a 7-point scale. b Technology 
Familiarity was measured with open ended questions (responses ranged 0 to 
1000). 
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Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations of the Main Variables by Gender and Condition 
 Males Females 
 Distributive Integrative Distributive Integrative 
Variables Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Preferences a 3.15 1.82 3.23 1.73 4.52 2.02 4.07 1.81 
Fear of 
Backlash b 398.78 127.16 396.46 130.77 426.44 131.77 442.25 124.49 
Anxiety a 3.21 1.15 3.40 1.10 4.11 1.31 4.32 1.10 
Self-efficacyc  71.06 15.54 70.33 13.24 62.46 18.86 63.33 17.12 
Note. a Preferences and Anxiety were measured on a 7-point scale. b Backlash was 
an open ended question (points ranged from 150 to 750). c Self-efficacy was 
measured on a 100-point scale. 
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Table 3 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of the Main Variables 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Gender a     ---     ---      ---     
2. Method b     ---     ---  0.24**      ---    
3. Preferences     3.63      2.04  0.28**  0.76**      ---   
4. Fear of Backlash 415.72  129.13  0.14*  0.16*  0.22**      ---  
5. Anxiety     3.76      1.25  0.36**  0.28**  0.28** -0.18**      --- 
6. Self-efficacy   66.82    16.65 -0.23** -0.28** -0.26**  0.26** -0.41** 
Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01. a Gender (Male = 0, Female = 1). b Method (Face-to-
face = 0, Virtual = 1). 
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Table 4 
Coefficients for Logistic Regression Main Effects Model 0  for Choice of 
Negotiation Medium 
 b SE z  p 
Intercept -0.50 0.28 -1.81 0.070 
Gender  0.58 0.33  1.79 0.074 
Condition -0.56 0.31 -1.79 0.073 
Fear of Backlash -0.16 0.16 -1.00 0.317 
Anxiety  0.36 0.18  2.01 0.045* 
Self-efficacy -0.41 0.19 -2.21 0.024* 
Note. * p < .05. N = 206. 
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Table 5 
Coefficients for Logistic Regression Interaction Model 1 for Choice of 
Negotiation Medium 
 b SE z  p 
Intercept -0.49 0.33 -1.46 0.145 
Gender  0.67 0.45  1.49 0.137 
Condition -0.52 0.47 -1.09 0.275 
Backlash  0.03 0.23  0.13 0.894 
Anxiety  0.85 0.32  2.67 0.008** 
Self-efficacy -0.13 0.32 -0.43 0.670 
Gender*Fear of Backlash -0.42 0.33 -1.27 0.203 
Gender*Anxiety -0.78 0.39 -1.97 0.048* 
Gender*Self-efficacy -0.36 0.40 -0.91 0.363 
Gender*Condition -0.14 0.64 -0.22 0.829 
Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01. N = 206. 
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Table 6 
Chi Squared Test Comparing Model 1 to Model 0 
 Res. Df Res. Dev Df Deviance p 
Model 0 200 244.48    
Model 1 196 238.47 4 6.011 0.198 
Note. * p < .05. 
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Table 7 
Probability Estimates for Choice of Negotiation Medium for Logistic Regression 
Main Effects Model 0  
Gender Condition Logit Odds Ratio 
Probability of 
Choosing Text-
based Chat 
Program 
Probability 
of Choosing 
Face-to-Face 
Male Distributive -0.50 0.61 0.3773 0.6227 
Male Integrative -1.06 0.35 0.2573 0.7427 
Female Distributive  0.08 1.08 0.5202 0.4798 
Female Integrative -0.48 0.62 0.3826 0.6174 
Note. N = 206. 
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Table 8 
Probability Estimates for Choice of Negotiation Medium for Logistic Regression 
Main Effects Model 1 
Gender Condition Logit Odds Ratio 
Probability of 
Choosing Text-
based Chat 
Program 
Probability 
of Choosing 
Face-to-Face 
Male Distributive -0.63 0.54 0.3488 0.6512 
Male Integrative -1.14 0.32 0.2423 0.7577 
Female Distributive  0.04 1.05 0.5112 0.4888 
Female Integrative -0.47 0.62 0.3843 0.6157 
Note. N = 206. 
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Table 9 
Probability Estimates for Choice of Negotiation Medium for Logistic Regression 
Main Effects Model 1based on Anxiety as a Moderator 
Gender Condition Anxiety Logit Odds Ratio 
Probability of 
Choosing Text-
based Chat 
Program 
Probability 
of Choosing 
Face-to-Face 
Male Distributive Low -1.04 0.35 0.2608 0.7392 
Male Distributive High -0.21 0.81 0.4486 0.5514 
Male Integrative Low -1.56 0.21 0.1739 0.8261 
Male Integrative High -0.72 0.49 0.3268 0.6732 
Female Distributive Low -0.37 0.69 0.4078 0.5922 
Female Distributive High  0.46 1.59 0.6136 0.3864 
Female Integrative Low -0.89 0.41 0.2912 0.7088 
Female Integrative High -0.05 0.95 0.4866 0.5134 
Note. N = 206. 
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Table 10 
Coefficients for Main Effects Model 0, examining the effects of gender, fear of 
backlash, anxiety, and negotiator self-efficacy on preference for virtual 
negotiations 
 b SE t  p 
Intercept -0.13 0.12 -1.10 0.271 
Gender  0.38 0.14  2.73 0.007** 
Condition -0.12 0.13 -0.93 0.352 
Fear of Backlash  0.12 0.07  1.75 0.083 
Anxiety  0.13 0.08  1.82 0.070 
Self-efficacy -0.12 0.07 -1.67 0.096 
Note. * p < .05. 
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Table 11 
Coefficients for Interaction Model 1, examining the interaction of gender on fear 
of backlash, anxiety, negotiator self-efficacy, and condition for preference of 
virtual negotiations 
 b SE t  p 
Intercept -0.17 0.14 -1.25 0.215 
Gender  0.52 0.20  2.76 0.006** 
Condition  0.00 0.18  0.00 0.999 
Backlash -0.03 0.09  -0.34 0.732 
Anxiety  0.23 0.12   1.98 0.049* 
Self-efficacy -0.16 0.12 -1.34 0.183 
Gender*Fear of Backlash  0.33 0.13  2.46 0.015* 
Gender*Anxiety -0.19 0.15 -1.27 0.204 
Gender*Self-efficacy  0.09 0.15  0.64 0.525 
Gender*Condition -0.27 0.26 -1.06 0.293 
Note. * p < .05; ** p < .01. 
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Table 12 
ANOVA Comparing Model 1 to Model 0 
 Res. Df RSS Df Sum of Squares F p 
Model 0 200 173.85     
Model 1 196 166.20 4 7.647 2.254 0.065 
Note. * p < .05. 
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Figure 1. Flow diagram of the experimental procedure.
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Figure 2. Model for Hypotheses III-VIII. This figure illustrates the relationships 
of the variables Fear of Backlash, Anxiety, and Self-efficacy on preference for 
virtual negotiations, with Gender as a moderator. 
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Figure 3. Interaction for Hypothesis VI illustrating the relationship between fear 
of backlash and preference for virtual negotiations by gender. 
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Figure 4. Interaction for Hypothesis VII illustrating the relationship between 
anxiety and preference for virtual negotiations by gender. 
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Figure 5. Interaction for Hypothesis VIII illustrating the relationship between 
self-efficacy and preference for virtual negotiations by gender. 
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Figure 6. Interaction for Negotiation Framing Condition (Distributive vs. 
Integrative) illustrating the relationship between self-efficacy and preference for 
virtual negotiations by gender. 
Distributive Integrative 
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Appendix A 
Random Numbers Tables 
 
Males 
Participant Condition Participant Condition Participant Condition 
1     Distributive 41     Integrative 81     Distributive 
2     Distributive 42     Distributive 82     Distributive 
3     Integrative 43     Distributive 83     Distributive 
4     Distributive 44     Distributive 84     Integrative 
5     Distributive 45     Distributive 85     Distributive 
6     Integrative 46     Distributive 86     Distributive 
7     Distributive 47     Distributive 87     Integrative 
8     Integrative 48     Integrative 88     Distributive 
9     Integrative 49     Distributive 89     Integrative 
10     Integrative 50     Distributive 90     Integrative 
11     Integrative 51     Integrative 91     Distributive 
12     Distributive 52     Integrative 92     Integrative 
13     Distributive 53     Integrative 93     Integrative 
14     Integrative 54     Integrative 94     Distributive 
15     Distributive 55     Integrative 95     Distributive 
16     Distributive 56     Integrative 96     Integrative 
17     Integrative 57     Integrative 97     Integrative 
18     Integrative 58     Distributive 98     Integrative 
19     Integrative 59     Distributive 99     Integrative 
20     Distributive 60     Distributive 100     Distributive 
21     Integrative 61     Distributive 101     Integrative 
22     Distributive 62     Distributive 102     Distributive 
23     Distributive 63     Integrative 103     Distributive 
24     Integrative 64     Distributive 104     Distributive 
25     Integrative 65     Integrative 105     Distributive 
26     Integrative 66     Integrative 106     Integrative 
27     Distributive 67     Distributive 107     Distributive 
28     Integrative 68     Integrative 108     Integrative 
29     Integrative 69     Integrative 109     Integrative 
30     Distributive 70     Integrative 110     Integrative 
31     Integrative 71     Distributive 111     Integrative 
32     Integrative 72     Distributive 112     Distributive 
33     Distributive 73     Integrative 113     Distributive 
34     Integrative 74     Distributive 114     Integrative 
35     Integrative 75     Distributive 115     Distributive 
36     Integrative 76     Integrative 116     Distributive 
37     Distributive 77     Integrative 117     Distributive 
38     Distributive 78     Distributive 118     Integrative 
39     Integrative 79     Distributive 119     Integrative 
40     Integrative 80     Distributive 120     Distributive 
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Females 
Participant Condition Participant Condition Participant Condition 
121 Distributive 161 Distributive 201 Integrative 
122 Integrative 162 Integrative 202 Integrative 
123 Integrative 163 Integrative 203 Integrative 
124 Distributive 164 Integrative 204 Integrative 
125 Distributive 165 Distributive 205 Integrative 
126 Integrative 166 Integrative 206 Integrative 
127 Distributive 167 Integrative 207 Integrative 
128 Distributive 168 Integrative 208 Integrative 
129 Integrative 169 Integrative 209 Integrative 
130 Distributive 170 Distributive 210 Distributive 
131 Distributive 171 Distributive 211 Integrative 
132 Integrative 172 Integrative 212 Distributive 
133 Integrative 173 Integrative 213 Distributive 
134 Integrative 174 Distributive 214 Distributive 
135 Distributive 175 Distributive 215 Distributive 
136 Distributive 176 Integrative 216 Integrative 
137 Distributive 177 Distributive 217 Distributive 
138 Integrative 178 Distributive 218 Integrative 
139 Distributive 179 Integrative 219 Distributive 
140 Integrative 180 Distributive 220 Distributive 
141 Distributive 181 Distributive 221 Integrative 
142 Distributive 182 Distributive 222 Integrative 
143 Integrative 183 Integrative 223 Integrative 
144 Distributive 184 Distributive 224 Distributive 
145 Distributive 185 Distributive 225 Integrative 
146 Integrative 186 Distributive 226 Integrative 
147 Integrative 187 Distributive 227 Distributive 
148 Distributive 188 Integrative 228 Distributive 
149 Distributive 189 Integrative 229 Distributive 
150 Integrative 190 Integrative 230 Distributive 
151 Distributive 191 Integrative 231 Distributive 
152 Distributive 192 Distributive 232 Distributive 
153 Distributive 193 Integrative 233 Distributive 
154 Distributive 194 Integrative 234 Integrative 
155 Integrative 195 Distributive 235 Distributive 
156 Distributive 196 Integrative 236 Distributive 
157 Distributive 197 Distributive 237 Integrative 
158 Distributive 198 Distributive 238 Distributive 
159 Distributive 199 Distributive 239 Integrative 
160 Distributive 200 Integrative 240 Distributive 
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Appendix B 
Consent form 
ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
LANDING A NEW JOB  
 
Principal Investigator: Kaitlyn Gallagher 
Institution: DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, USA 
Department (School, College): Department of Psychology, College of Science & 
Health 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
We are asking you to be in a research study because we are trying to learn more 
about job offer negotiation. This study is being conducted by Kaitlyn Gallagher, a 
graduate Industrial/Organizational psychology student for her Master’s thesis. We 
hope to include 200 participants in this research. 
 
Why are you being asked to be in the research? 
You are invited to participate in this study because you are a student in the 
participant pool at DePaul University and speak English. You must be age 18 or 
older to be in this study. This study is not approved for the enrollment of people 
under the age of 18. 
 
What is involved in being in the research study? 
If you agree to be in this study, being in the research involves completing a few 
questionnaires, then participating in a negotiation with a counterpart. 
• You will be told about participating in a simulated job offer negotiation. 
You will receive some instruction about your negotiation counterpart and 
how the negotiation will be scored. 
• You will be asked about your preferences for the negotiation, your 
feelings about the negotiation, and some demographic information about 
yourself (past negotiation experience, work experience, gender, 
race/ethnicity) 
 
How much time will this take? 
This study will take about 45 minutes of your time. 
 
Are there any risks involved in participating in this study? 
Being in this study does not involve any risks other than what you would 
encounter in daily life. You may feel uncomfortable or embarrassed about 
answering certain questions or the idea of negotiation.  You do not have to answer 
any questions you do not want to.  
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Are there any benefits to participating in this study? 
You will not personally benefit from being in this study.  We hope that what we 
learn will help contribute to the knowledge in the field for negotiation. 
 
 
Is there any kind of payment, reimbursement or credit for being in this study? 
You will be given 1.5 psychology subject pool credits for participation in the 
research. At the end of the research activity you will be asked to provide your 
SONA subject pool number on a separate sheet of paper so that we may give you 
credit. If you do not complete the study but stay for more than a half hour you will 
receive 1 credit. If you do not complete the study and stay for less than a half hour 
you will receive 0.5 credits. You must provide your subject pool number in order 
to be given credit. 
 
Can you decide not to participate?   
Your participation is voluntary, which means you can choose not to participate.  
There will be no negative consequences, penalties, or loss of benefits if you 
decide not to participate or change your mind later and withdraw from the 
research after you begin participating. Your decision whether or not to participate 
in this research will not affect your grades at DePaul University. 
 
Who will see my study information and how will the confidentiality of the 
information collected for the research be protected? 
The research records will be kept and stored securely. The data will be recorded 
in a de-identified manner.  We will keep your responses confidential. Your 
information will be combined with information from other people taking part in 
the study. When we write about the study or publish a paper to share the research 
with other researchers, we will write about the combined information we have 
gathered. We will not include your name or any information that will directly 
identify you. We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the 
research team from knowing that you gave us information, or what that 
information is.   However, some people might review or copy our records that 
may identify you in order to make sure we are following the required rules, laws, 
and regulations.  For example, the DePaul University Institutional Review Board 
may review your information.  If they look at our records, they will keep your 
information confidential. 
 
Who should be contacted for more information about the research? 
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, 
please ask any questions that might come to mind now.  Later, if you have 
questions, suggestions, concerns, or complaints about the study or you want to get 
additional information or provide input about this research, you can contact the 
researcher, Kaitlyn Gallagher (kgalla26@depaul.edu) or her advisor, Dr. Alice 
Stuhlmacher (773-325-2050). 
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This research has been reviewed and approved by the DePaul Institutional Review 
Board (IRB). If you have questions about your rights as a research subject you 
may contact Susan Loess-Perez, DePaul University’s Director of Research 
Compliance, in the Office of Research Services at 312-362-7593 or by email at 
sloesspe@depaul.edu.   
 
You may also contact DePaul’s Office of Research Services if: 
• Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the 
research team. 
• You cannot reach the research team. 
• You want to talk to someone besides the research team. 
 
You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records. 
 
Statement of Consent from the Subject:   
I have read the above information.  I have had all my questions and concerns 
answered. By signing below, I indicate my consent to be in the research.  
 
Signature:_______________________________________________  
 
Printed name: ________________________________________Date: 
_________________ 
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Appendix C 
Tasks 
Distributive: 
 
You have been hired for a new job, but you still need to work out the finer details 
of terms of employment with your hiring manager. Think of this task as a 
negotiation in which you are trying to get what you want and must bargain 
for it. 
 
 
Integrative: 
 
You have been hired for a new job, but you still need to work out the finer details 
of terms of employment with your hiring manager. Think of this task as a 
negotiation in which you face a common problem and must work with the 
hiring manager to create a deal that works for both you and the company.  
 
 
This table shows the options that you will discuss: 
 
Option                       
Points 
Option                         
Points 
Option                       
Points 
Salary 
 
$50,000                         0    
  
$52,000                     100    
   
$54,000                     200 
 
$56,000                     300 
 
$58,000                     400  
Vacation Days 
 
5 days                             0 
 
8 days                           25 
 
12 days                         50 
 
15 days                       100  
 
20 days                       150 
 
Starting Date 
 
June 1                        200   
 
June 15                      100 
 
July 1                          50 
 
July 15                         25 
 
August 1                        0           
 
The points indicate how valuable that selection is to you. In this 
negotiation, you can earn a maximum of 750 points. You should walk 
away from the negotiation (impasse) if you cannot achieve at least 
150 points. 
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Take a few minutes and list three tactics you will use to meet this 
goal (of getting what you want / creating a deal that works for both 
you and the company) 
1. ____________________ 
2. ____________________ 
3. ____________________ 
 
This table shows the options that you will discuss: 
 
Option                 Points Option                   Points Option                   Points 
First-year Bonus 
 
$1,000                        0    
  
$2,000                     100    
   
$4,000                     200 
 
$6,000                     300 
 
$8,000                     400  
Company Car 
 
Honda                           0 
 
Hyundai                      25 
 
Mazda                         50 
 
BMW                        100  
 
Mercedes                  150 
 
Training Opportunities 
 
Every 6 months          200   
 
Every 12 month          100 
 
Every 18 months          50 
 
Every 24 months          25 
 
Every 32 months            0           
 
 
The points indicate how valuable that selection is to you. In this 
negotiation, you can earn a maximum of 750 points. You should walk 
away from the negotiation (impasse) if you cannot achieve at least 
150 points. 
 
Take a few minutes and list three tactics you will use to meet this 
goal (of getting what you want / creating a deal that works for both 
you and the company) 
1. ____________________ 
2. ____________________ 
3. ____________________ 
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Appendix D 
Goals and First Offer 
The following questions concern your plans for the upcoming 
negotiation. Please indicate...   
 
The ideal number of points you want to achieve in the 
negotiation (that is your goal)  
The least number of points you are willing to accept before 
walking away from the negotiation at an impasse (that is your 
limit) 
 
 
 
Now, make your first offer to your counterpart.  
For each category please circle one value.  
 
Circle one value for each category: 
Option                   Points Option                   Points Option                   Points 
Salary 
 
$50,000                         0    
  
$52,000                     100    
   
$54,000                     200 
 
$56,000                     300 
 
$58,000                     400  
Vacation Days 
 
5 days                            0 
 
8 days                          25 
 
12 days                        50 
 
15 days                      100  
 
20 days                      150 
 
Starting Date 
 
June 1                        200   
 
June 15                      100 
 
July 1                          50 
 
July 15                        25 
 
August 1                       0           
 
 
 
The following questions concern your plans for the upcoming 
negotiation. Please indicate...   
 
How much (in total points value) do you think you can 
reasonably ask for without your counterpart perceiving 
you to be a pushy person? 
 
How much (in total points value) do you think you can 
reasonably ask for without causing your counterpart to 
punish you for being too demanding? 
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Now, make your first offer to your counterpart.  
For each category please circle one value.  
 
Circle one value for each category: 
 
Option                 Points Option                   Points Option                   Points 
First-year Bonus 
 
$1,000                        0    
  
$2,000                     100    
   
$4,000                     200 
 
$6,000                     300 
 
$8,000                     400  
Company Car 
 
Honda                           0 
 
Hyundai                      25 
 
Mazda                         50 
 
BMW                        100  
 
Mercedes                  150 
 
Training Opportunities 
 
Every 6 months          200   
 
Every 12 month          100 
 
Every 18 months          50 
 
Every 24 months          25 
 
Every 32 months            0           
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Appendix E 
Negotiator Self-efficacy (Sullivan, O'Connor, & Burris, 2006) 
 
Please indicate on a 100-point scale (0 = no confidence, 100 = full confidence) 
your confidence that you can use the following tactics successfully in the 
following negotiation: 
 
1. Persuade the other negotiator to make most of the 
concessions. __________ 
2. Convince the other negotiator to agree with me. __________ 
3. Gain the upper hand against the other negotiator __________ 
4. Prevent the other negotiator from exploiting your 
weaknesses. __________ 
5. Find trade-offs that benefit both parties                                             __________ 
6. Exchange concessions                                                                      __________ 
7. Look for an agreement that maximizes both 
negotiators’ interests’ __________ 
8. Establish a high level of rapport with the other 
negotiator               __________ 
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Appendix F 
Negotiator Anxiety (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011) 
 
For the upcoming negotiation, how strongly do you feel: 
 
Not 
strongly 
at all   Moderately   
Very 
Strongly 
Anxious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Neutral 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Apprehensive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Indifferent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Worried 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Unemotional 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Calm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix G 
Negotiation Medium Preference 
 
1. How would you like to negotiate today? 
Face-to-face    Text-based Chat Program 
 
 
2. Please circle a number for how strongly you would prefer to negotiate 
either face-to-face or over a virtual text-based chat program: 
 
(Face-to-Face)  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 (Virtual) 
 
 
 
 
While we set up, what are the reasons you picked the method of negotiation that you 
did (face-to-face or chat)? 
 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
____________ 
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Appendix H 
Demographic Survey 
1. How much formal experience have you had negotiating face-to face (this 
includes negotiation/mediation courses or formal experience)? 
1        2                     3                    4                 5                 6                  
7 
(No experienced)                                     (Some experience)                   
(I’m an expert) 
2. How much formal experience have you had negotiating virtually through 
technology (this includes negotiation/mediation courses or formal 
experience)? 
1        2                     3                    4                 5                 6                  
7 
(No experienced)                                     (Some experience)                   
(I’m an expert) 
3. On an average day, how many text-messages do you send? 
_____________ 
 
4. On an average day, how many emails do you send? _____________ 
 
5. On an average day, how many phone calls are you on? _____________ 
 
6. On an average day, how many video calls are you on (Skype, Facetime)? 
_____________ 
 
7. Please indicate your gender: 
                      Male 
 
 
 
 
                                 Female  
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8. Please indicate your race/ethnicity: 
Black/African American 
American Indian/Alaskan Native 
Asian /Pacific Islander  
Latino/Hispanic/Spanish Origin 
White 
Biracial 
Other 
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Appendix I 
Negotiator Relief/Regret (Kray & Gelfand, 2009) 
 
1. How relieved are you that there is no real negotiation? 
1      2            3           4         5               6             7 
(Not relieved)                            (Moderately)                   (Very relieved) 
2. How much do you regret not being able to negotiate?  
1        2             3             4        5             6           7 
(Not regretful)                             (Moderately)                    (Very regretful) 
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Appendix J 
Debriefing Forms 
 
Thank you so much for participating in this research session, we very much 
appreciate your willingness to be involved in this research. 
This study looked at negotiation, which is a very common interaction in many 
everyday situations. While you may have not been familiar with job negotiation, 
we wanted a task that was relevant to students. 
We asked people to choose whether they prefer to negotiate via face-to-face or 
through a computer chat program. There is no actual negotiation involved in this 
study. We wanted you to have the same feelings that you might have if there 
would be an actual negotiation.     
We are interested how factors like gender, self-efficacy, and anxiety influenced 
the choice to be face-to face or over the computer.   
You no doubt understand that it is important to have a similar environment for 
everyone who participates in the study. Because of this, we need your help in not 
revealing information about this study to others who may be involved or might do 
this study in the future. This is very important so that we are able to compare 
across people and that participants enter the study with the same information. 
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Thank you so much for participating in this research session, we very much 
appreciate your willingness to be involved in this research. 
This study looked at negotiation, which is a very common interaction in many 
everyday situations. While you may have not been familiar with negotiations, we 
wanted a task that was relevant to students. 
This research has been reviewed and approved by the DePaul Institutional Review 
Board (IRB). If you have questions about your rights as a research subject you may 
contact Susan Loess-Perez, DePaul University’s Director of Research Compliance, 
in the Office of Research Services at 312-362-7593 or by email at 
sloesspe@depaul.edu.   
Below are a couple of references for more information on negotiation, and you 
can also contact Kaitlyn Gallagher (kgalla26@depaul.edu) or Dr. Alice 
Stuhlmacher (astuhlma@depaul.edu ,773-325-2050) for more information. Again, 
thank you so much for your time and participation. 
Elfenbein, H. A. (2015). Individual differences in negotiation: A nearly 
abandoned pursuit revived. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 
24(2), 131-136.    
 
Stuhlmacher, A. F., & Linnabery, E. (2013). Gender and negotiation: a social role 
analysis. In M. Olekalns, & W. Adair (Eds.), Handbook of research on 
negotiation research (pp. 221-248). 
 
Thompson, L. L., Wang, J., & Gunia, B. C. (2010). Negotiation. Annual Review 
of Psychology, 61, 491-515. 
 
 
 
